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Abstract—Deep learning is at the heart of the current rise of artificial intelligence. In the field of Computer Vision, it has become the
workhorse for applications ranging from self-driving cars to surveillance and security. Whereas deep neural networks have
demonstrated phenomenal success (often beyond human capabilities) in solving complex problems, recent studies show that they are
vulnerable to adversarial attacks in the form of subtle perturbations to inputs that lead a model to predict incorrect outputs. For images,
such perturbations are often too small to be perceptible, yet they completely fool the deep learning models. Adversarial attacks pose a
serious threat to the success of deep learning in practice. This fact has recently lead to a large influx of contributions in this direction.
This article presents the first comprehensive survey on adversarial attacks on deep learning in Computer Vision. We review the works
that design adversarial attacks, analyze the existence of such attacks and propose defenses against them. To emphasize that
adversarial attacks are possible in practical conditions, we separately review the contributions that evaluate adversarial attacks in the
real-world scenarios. Finally, drawing on the reviewed literature, we provide a broader outlook of this research direction.
Index Terms—Deep Learning, adversarial perturbation, black-box attack, white-box attack, adversarial learning, perturbation
detection.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
D EEP LEARNING [1] is providing major breakthroughsin solving the problems that have withstood many
attempts of machine learning and artificial intelligence com-
munity in the past. As a result, it is currently being used to
decipher hard scientific problems at an unprecedented scale,
e.g. in reconstruction of brain circuits [2]; analysis of muta-
tions in DNA [3]; prediction of structure-activity of potential
drug molecules [4], and analyzing the particle accelerator
data [5] [6]. Deep neural networks have also become the
preferred choice to solve many challenging tasks in speech
recognition [7] and natural language understanding [8].
In the field of Computer Vision, deep learning became
the center of attention after Krizhevsky et al. [9] demon-
strated the impressive performance of a Convolutional Neu-
ral Network (CNN) [10] based model on a very challenging
large-scale visual recognition task [11] in 2012. A significant
credit for the current popularity of deep learning can also be
attributed to this seminal work. Since 2012, the Computer
Vision community has made numerous valuable contribu-
tions to deep learning research, enabling it to provide solu-
tions for the problems encountered in medical science [21]
to mobile applications [181]. The recent breakthrough in
artificial intelligence in the form of tabula-rasa learning of
AlphaGo Zero [14] also owes a fair share to deep Residual
Networks (ResNets) [147] that were originally proposed for
the task of image recognition.
With the continuous improvements of deep neural net-
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work models [145], [147], [168]; open access to efficient
deep learning software libraries [177], [178], [179]; and easy
availability of hardware required to train complex models,
deep learning is fast achieving the maturity to enter into
safety and security critical applications, e.g. self driving
cars [12], [182], surveillance [13], maleware detection [34],
[107], drones and robotics [157], [180], and voice command
recognition [7]. With the recent real-world developments
like facial recognition ATM [183] and Face ID security on
mobile phones [184], it is apparent that deep learning so-
lutions, especially those originating from Computer Vision
problems are about to play a major role in our daily lives.
Whereas deep learning performs a wide variety of Com-
puter Vision tasks with remarkable accuracies, Szegedy et
al. [22] first discovered an intriguing weakness of deep
neural networks in the context of image classification. They
showed that despite their high accuracies, modern deep
networks are surprisingly susceptible to adversarial attacks
in the form of small perturbations to images that remain
(almost) imperceptible to human vision system. Such attacks
can cause a neural network classifier to completely change
its prediction about the image. Even worse, the attacked
models report high confidence on the wrong prediction.
Moreover, the same image perturbation can fool multiple
network classifiers. The profound implications of these re-
sults triggered a wide interest of researchers in adversarial
attacks and their defenses for deep learning in general.
Since the findings of Szegedy et al. [22], several inter-
esting results have surfaced regarding adversarial attacks
on deep learning in Computer Vision. For instance, in ad-
dition to the image-specific adversarial perturbations [22],
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [16] showed the existence of ‘uni-
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Fig. 1: Example of attacks on deep learning models with ‘universal adversarial perturbations’ [16]: The attacks are shown
for the CaffeNet [9], VGG-F network [17] and GoogLeNet [18]. All the networks recognized the original clean images
correctly with high confidence. After small perturbations were added to the images, the networks predicted wrong labels
with similar high confidence. Notice that the perturbations are hardly perceptible for human vision system, however their
effects on the deep learning models are catastrophic.
versal perturbations’ that can fool a network classifier on
any image (see Fig. 1 for example). Similarly, Athalye et
al. [65] demonstrated that it is possible to even 3-D print
real-world objects that can fool deep neural network clas-
sifiers (see Section 4.3). Keeping in view the significance
of deep learning research in Computer Vision and its po-
tential applications in the real life, this article presents the
first comprehensive survey on adversarial attacks on deep
learning in Computer Vision. The article is intended for a
wider readership than Computer Vision community, hence
it assumes only basic knowledge of deep learning and image
processing. Nevertheless, it also discusses technical details
of important contributions for the interested readers.
We first describe the common terms related to adversar-
ial attacks in the parlance of Computer Vision in Section 2.
In Section 3, we review the adversarial attacks for the task of
image classification and beyond. A separate section is dedi-
cated to the approaches that deal with adversarial attacks in
the real-world conditions. Those approaches are reviewed in
Section 4. In the literature, there are also works that mainly
focus on analyzing the existence of adversarial attacks. We
discuss those contributions in Section 5. The approaches
that make defense against the adversarial attacks as their
central topic are discussed in Section 6. In Section 7, we
provide a broader outlook of the research direction based
on the reviewed literature. Finally, we draw conclusion in
Section 8.
2 DEFINITIONS OF TERMS
In this section, we describe the common technical terms
used in the literature related to adversarial attacks on deep
learning in Computer Vision. The remaining article also
follows the same definitions of the terms.
• Adversarial example/image is a modified version of a
clean image that is intentionally perturbed (e.g. by
adding noise) to confuse/fool a machine learning
technique, such as deep neural networks.
• Adversarial perturbation is the noise that is added to
the clean image to make it an adversarial example.
• Adversarial training uses adversarial images besides
the clean images to train machine learning models.
• Adversary more commonly refers to the agent who
creates an adversarial example. However, in some
cases the example itself is also called adversary.
• Black-box attacks feed a targeted model with the ad-
versarial examples (during testing) that are gener-
ated without the knowledge of that model. In some
instances, it is assumed that the adversary has a
limited knowledge of the model (e.g. its training
procedure and/or its architecture) but definitely does
not know about the model parameters. In other
instances, using any information about the target
model is referred to as ‘semi-black-box’ attack. We
use the former convention in this article.
• Detector is a mechanism to (only) detect if an image
is an adversarial example.
• Fooling ratio/rate indicates the percentage of images
on which a trained model changes its prediction label
after the images are perturbed.
• One-shot/one-step methods generate an adversarial per-
turbation by performing a single step computation,
e.g. computing gradient of model loss once. The
opposite are iterative methods that perform the same
computation multiple times to get a single perturba-
tion. The latter are often computationally expensive.
• Quasi-imperceptible perturbations impair images very
slightly for human perception.
• Rectifier modifies an adversarial example to restore
the prediction of the targeted model to its prediction
on the clean version of the same example.
• Targeted attacks fool a model into falsely predicting
a specific label for the adversarial image. They are
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opposite to the non-targeted attacks in which the
predicted label of the adversarial image is irrelevant,
as long as it is not the correct label.
• Threat model refers to the types of potential attacks
considered by an approach, e.g. black-box attack.
• Transferability refers to the ability of an adversarial
example to remain effective even for the models
other than the one used to generate it.
• Universal perturbation is able to fool a given model
on ‘any’ image with high probability. Note that,
universality refers to the property of a perturbation
being ‘image-agnostic’ as opposed to having good
transferability.
• White-box attacks assume the complete knowledge of
the targeted model, including its parameter values,
architecture, training method, and in some cases its
training data as well.
3 ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
In this section, we review the body of literature in Computer
Vision that introduces methods for adversarial attacks on
deep learning. The reviewed literature mainly deals with the
art of fooling the deep neural networks in ‘laboratory set-
tings’, where approaches are developed for the typical Com-
puter Vision tasks, e.g. recognition, and their effectiveness
is demonstrated using standard datasets, e.g. MNIST [10].
The techniques that focus on attacking deep learning in the
real-world conditions are separately reviewed in Section 4.
However, it should be noted that the approaches reviewed
in this section form the basis of the real-world attacks, and
almost each one of them has the potential to significantly
affect deep learning in practice. Our division is based on
the evaluation conditions of the attacks in the original
contributions.
The review in this section is mainly organized in chrono-
logical order, with few exceptions to maintain the flow of
discussion. To provide technical understanding of the core
concepts to the reader, we also go into technical details of the
popular approaches and some representative techniques of
the emerging directions in this area. Other methods are dis-
cussed briefly. We refer to the original papers for the details
on those techniques. This section is divided into two parts.
In part 3.1, we review the methods that attack deep neural
networks performing the most common task in Computer
Vision, i.e. classification/recognition. Approaches that are
predominantly designed to attack deep learning beyond this
task are discussed in part 3.2.
3.1 Attacks for classification
3.1.1 Box-constrained L-BFGS
Szegedy et al. [22] first demonstrated the existence of small
perturbations to the images, such that the perturbed images
could fool deep learning models into misclassification. Let
Ic ∈ Rm denote a vectorized clean image - the subscript ‘c’
emphasizes that the image is clean. To compute an additive
perturbation ρ ∈ Rm that would distort the image very
slightly to fool the network, Szegedy et al. proposed to solve
the following problem:
min
ρ
||ρ||2 s.t. C(Ic + ρ) = `; Ic + ρ ∈ [0, 1]m, (1)
Fig. 2: Illustration of adversarial examples generated us-
ing [22] for AlexNet [9]. The perturbations are magnified 10x
for better visualization (values shifted by 128 and clamped).
The predicted labels of adversarial examples are also shown.
where ‘`’ denotes the label of the image and C(.) is the deep
neural network classifier. The authors proposed to solve
(1) for its non-trivial solution where ‘`’ is different from
the original label of Ic. In that case, (1) becomes a hard
problem, hence an approximate solution is sought using a
box-constrained L-BFGS [20]. This is done by finding the
minimum c > 0 for which the minimizer ρ of the following
problem satisfies the condition C(Ic + ρ) = `:
min
ρ
c|ρ|+ L(Ic + ρ, `) s.t. Ic + ρ ∈ [0, 1]m, (2)
where L(., .) computes the loss of the classifier. We note that
(2) results in the exact solution for a classifier that has a
convex loss function. However, for deep neural networks,
this is generally not the case. The computed perturbation
is simply added to the image to make it an adversarial
example.
As shown in Fig. 2, the above method is able to compute
perturbations that when added to clean images fool a neural
network, but the adversarial images appear similar to the
clean images to the human vision system. It was observed
by Szegedy et al. that the perturbations computed for one
neural network were also able to fool multiple networks.
These astonishing results identified a blind-spot in deep
learning. At the time of this discovery the Computer Vi-
sion community was fast adapting to the impression that
deep learning features define the space where perceptual
distances are well approximated by the Euclidean distances.
Hence, these contradictory results triggered a wide interest
of researchers in adversarial attacks on deep learning in
Computer Vision.
3.1.2 Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
It was observed by Szegedy et al. [22] that the robustness
of deep neural networks against the adversarial examples
could be improved by adversarial training. To enable effec-
tive adversarial training, Goodfellow et al. [23] developed
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a method to efficiently compute an adversarial perturbation
for a given image by solving the following problem:
ρ =  sign (∇J (θ, Ic, `)) , (3)
where ∇J (., ., .) computes the gradient of the cost function
around the current value of the model parameters θ w.r.t. Ic,
sign(.) denotes the sign function and  is a small scalar value
that restricts the norm of the perturbation. The method for
solving (3) was termed ‘Fast Gradient Sign Method’ (FGSM)
in the original work.
Interestingly, the adversarial examples generated by
FGSM exploit the ‘linearity’ of deep network models in
the higher dimensional space whereas such models were
commonly thought to be highly non-linear at that time.
Goodfellow et al. [23] hypothesized that the designs of
modern deep neural networks that (intentionally) encour-
age linear behavior for computational gains, also make them
susceptible to cheap analytical perturbations. In the related
literature, this idea is often referred to as the ‘linearity
hypothesis’, which is substantiated by the FGSM approach.
Kurakin et al. [80] noted that on the popular large-scale
image recognition data set ImageNet [11], the top-1 error
rate on the adversarial examples generated by FGSM is
around 63−69% for  ∈ [2, 32]. The authors also proposed a
‘one-step target class’ variation of the FGSM where instead
of using the true label ` of the image in (3), they used the
label `target of the least likely class predicted by the network
for Ic. The computed perturbation is then subtracted from
the original image to make it an adversarial example. For a
neural network with cross-entropy loss, doing so maximizes
the probability that the network predicts `target as the label
of the adversarial example. It is suggested, that a random
class can also be used as the target class for fooling the
network, however it may lead to less interesting fooling,
e.g. misclassification of one breed of dog as another dog
breed. The authors also demonstrated that adversarial train-
ing improves robustness of deep neural networks against
the attacks generated by FGSM and its proposed variants.
The FGSM perturbs an image to increase the loss of
the classifier on the resulting image. The sign function
ensures that the magnitude of the loss is maximized, while 
essentially restricts the `∞-norm of the perturbation. Miyato
et al. [103] proposed a closely related method to compute the
perturbation as follows
ρ = 
∇J (θ, Ic, `)
||∇J (θ, Ic, `)||2 . (4)
In the above equation, the computed gradient is normal-
ized with its `2-norm. Kurakin et al. [80] referred to this
technique as ‘Fast Gradient L2’ method and also proposed
an alternative of using the `∞-norm for normalization, and
referred to the resulting technique as ‘Fast Gradient L∞’
method. Broadly speaking, all of these methods are seen as
‘one-step’ or ‘one-shot’ methods in the literature related to
adversarial attacks in Computer Vision.
3.1.3 Basic & Least-Likely-Class Iterative Methods
The one-step methods perturb images by taking a single
large step in the direction that increases the loss of the
classifier (i.e. one-step gradient ascent). An intuitive exten-
sion of this idea is to iteratively take multiple small steps
while adjusting the direction after each step. The Basic
Iterative Method (BIM) [35] does exactly that, and iteratively
computes the following:
Ii+1ρ = Clip
{
Iiρ + α sign(∇J (θ, Iiρ, `)
}
, (5)
where Iiρ denotes the perturbed image at the i
th iteration,
Clip{.} clips (the values of the pixels of) the image in its
argument at  and α determines the step size (normally,
α = 1). The BIM algorithm starts with I0ρ = Ic and runs
for the number of iterations determined by the formula
bmin(+4, 1.25)c. Madry et al. [55] pointed out that BIM is
equivalent to (the `∞ version of) Projected Gradient Descent
(PGD), a standard convex optimization method.
Similar to extending the FGSM to its ‘one-step target
class’ variation, Kurakin et al. [35] also extended BIM to
Iterative Least-likely Class Method (ILCM). In that case, the
label ` of the image in (5) is replaced by the target label
`target of the least likely class predicted by the classifier. The
adversarial examples generated by the ILCM method has
been shown to seriously affect the classification accuracy of
a modern deep architecture Inception v3 [145], even for very
small values of , e.g. < 16.
3.1.4 Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA)
In the literature, it is more common to generate adversarial
examples by restricting `∞ or `2-norms of the perturba-
tions to make them imperceptible for humans. However,
Papernot et al. [60] also created an adversarial attack by
restricting the `0-norm of the perturbations. Physically, it
means that the goal is to modify only a few pixels in
the image instead of perturbing the whole image to fool
the classifier. The crux of their algorithm to generate the
desired adversarial image can be understood as follows.
The algorithm modifies pixels of the clean image one at a
time and monitors the effects of the change on the resulting
classification. The monitoring is performed by computing
a saliency map using the gradients of the outputs of the
network layers. In this map, a larger value indicates a higher
likelihood of fooling the network to predict `target as the label
of the modified image instead of the original label `. Thus,
the algorithm performs targeted fooling. Once the map has
been computed, the algorithm chooses the pixel that is most
effective to fool the network and alters it. This process is
repeated until either the maximum number of allowable
pixels are altered in the adversarial image or the fooling
succeeds.
3.1.5 One Pixel Attack
An extreme case for the adversarial attack is when only
one pixel in the image is changed to fool the classifier.
Interestingly, Su et al. [68] claimed successful fooling of three
different network models on 70.97% of the tested images
by changing just one pixel per image. They also reported
that the average confidence of the networks on the wrong
labels was found to be 97.47%. We show representative
examples of the adversarial images from [68] in Fig. 3. Su et
al. computed the adversarial examples by using the concept
of Differential Evolution [148]. For a clean image Ic, they
first created a set of 400 vectors in R5 such that each vector
contained xy-coordinates and RGB values for an arbitrary
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Fig. 3: Illustration of one pixel adversarial attacks [68]: The
correct label is mentioned with each image. The correspond-
ing predicted label is given in parentheses.
candidate pixel. Then, they randomly modified the elements
of the vectors to create children such that a child competes
with its parent for fitness in the next iteration, while the
probabilistic predicted label of the network is used as the
fitness criterion. The last surviving child is used to alter the
pixel in the image.
Even with such a simple evolutionary strategy Su et
al. [68] were able to show successful fooling of deep net-
works. Notice that, differential evolution enables their ap-
proach to generate adversarial examples without having
access to any information about the network parameter
values or their gradients. The only input their technique
requires is the probabilistic labels predicted by the targeted
model.
3.1.6 Carlini and Wagner Attacks (C&W)
A set of three adversarial attacks were introduced by Carlini
and Wagner [36] in the wake of defensive distillation against
the adversarial perturbations [38]. These attacks make the
perturbations quasi-imperceptible by restricting their `2, `∞
and `0 norms, and it is shown that defensive distillation
for the targeted networks almost completely fails against
these attacks. Moreover, it is also shown that the adversar-
ial examples generated using the unsecured (un-distilled)
networks transfer well to the secured (distilled) networks,
which makes the computed perturbations suitable for black-
box attacks.
Whereas it is more common to exploit the transfer-
ability property of adversarial examples to generate black-
box attacks, Chen et al. [41] also proposed ‘Zeroth Order
Optimization (ZOO)’ based attacks that directly estimate the
gradients of the targeted model for generating the adversar-
ial examples. These attacks were inspired by C&W attacks.
We refer to the original papers for further details on C&W
and ZOO attacks.
3.1.7 DeepFool
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [72] proposed to compute a minimal
norm adversarial perturbation for a given image in an
iterative manner. Their algorithm, i.e. DeepFool initializes
with the clean image that is assumed to reside in a region
confined by the decision boundaries of the classifier. This
region decides the class-label of the image. At each iteration,
the algorithm perturbs the image by a small vector that is
computed to take the resulting image to the boundary of the
polyhydron that is obtained by linearizing the boundaries
of the region within which the image resides. The perturba-
tions added to the image in each iteration are accumulated
to compute the final perturbation once the perturbed image
changes its label according to the original decision bound-
aries of the network. The authors show that the DeepFool
algorithm is able to compute perturbations that are smaller
than the perturbations computed by FGSM [23] in terms of
their norm, while having similar fooling ratios.
3.1.8 Universal Adversarial Perturbations
Whereas the methods like FGSM [23], ILCM [35], Deep-
Fool [72] etc. compute perturbations to fool a network on
a single image, the ‘universal’ adversarial perturbations
computed by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [16] are able to fool a
network on ‘any’ image with high probability. These image-
agnostic perturbations also remain quasi-imperceptible for
the human vision system, as can be observed in Fig. 1. To
formally define these perturbations, let us assume that clean
images are sampled from the distribution =c. A perturba-
tion ρ is ‘universal’ if it satisfies the following constraint:
P
Ic∼=c
(
C(Ic) 6= C(Ic + ρ)
)
≥ δ s.t. ||ρ||p ≤ ξ, (6)
where P(.) denotes the probability, δ ∈ (0, 1] is the fooling
ratio, ||.||p denotes the `p-norm and ξ is a pre-defined
constant. The smaller the value of ξ, the harder it is to
perceive the perturbation in the image. Strictly speaking,
the perturbations that satisfy (6) should be referred to as
(δ, ξ)-universal because of their strong dependence on the
mentioned parameters. However, these perturbations are
commonly referred to as the ‘universal adversarial pertur-
bations’ in the literature.
The authors computed the universal perturbations by
restricting their `2-norm as well as `∞-norm, and showed
that the perturbations with their norms upper bounded by
4% of the respective image norms already achieved signif-
icant fooling ratios of around 0.8 or more for state-of-the-
art image classifiers. Their iterative approach to compute
a perturbation is related to the DeepFool strategy [72] of
gradually pushing a data point (i.e. an image) to the decision
boundary for its class. However, in this case, ‘all’ the train-
ing data points are sequentially pushed to the respective
decision boundaries and the perturbations computed over
all the images are gradually accumulated by back-projecting
the accumulator to the desired `p ball of radius ξ every time.
The algorithm proposed by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [16]
computes perturbations while targeting a single network
model, e.g. ResNet [147]. However, it is shown that these
perturbations also generalize well across different networks
(especially those having similar architectures). In that sense,
the author’s claim the perturbations to be, to some extent,
‘doubly universal’. Moreover, it is also shown that high
fooling ratio (e.g. δ ≥ 0.5) is achievable by learning a
perturbation using only around 2, 000 training images.
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Khrulkov et al. [190] also proposed a method for con-
structing universal adversarial perturbations as singular
vectors of the Jacobian matrices of feature maps of the net-
works, which allowed for achieving relatively high fooling
rates using only a small number of images. Another method
to generate universal perturbations is fast-feature-fool by
Mopuri et al. [135]. Their method generates the universal
perturbations independent of data.
3.1.9 UPSET and ANGRI
Sarkar et al. [146] proposed two black-box attack algorithms,
namely UPSET: Universal Perturbations for Steering to Ex-
act Targets, and ANGRI: Antagonistic Network for Gen-
erating Rogue Images for targeted fooling of deep neural
networks. For ‘n’ classes, UPSET seeks to produce ‘n’ image-
agnostic perturbations such that when the perturbation is
added to an image that does not belong to a targeted class,
the classifier will classify the perturbed image as being from
that class. The power of UPSET comes from a residual
generating network R(.), that takes the target class ‘t’ as
input and produces a perturbation R(t) for fooling. The
overall method solves the following optimization problem
using the so-called UPSET network:
Iρ = max(min(sR(t) + Ic, 1),−1), (7)
where the pixel values in Ic are normalized to lie in [−1, 1],
and ‘s’ is a scalar. To ensure Iρ to be a valid image, all values
outside the interval [−1, 1] are clipped. As compared to the
image-agnostic perturbations of UPSET, ANGRI computes
image-specific perturbations in a closely related manner,
for which we refer to the original work. The perturbations
resulting from ANGRI are also used for targeted fooling.
Both algorithms have been reported to achieve high fooling
ratios on MNIST [10] and CIFAR-10 [152] datasets.
3.1.10 Houdini
Cisse et al. [131] proposed ‘Houdini’- an approach for fool-
ing gradient-based learning machines by generating adver-
sarial examples that can be tailored to task losses. Typical
algorithms that generate adversarial examples employ gra-
dients of differentiable loss functions of the networks to
compute the perturbations. However, task losses are often
not amenable to this approach. For instance, the task loss of
speech recognition is based on word-error-rate, which does
not allow straightforward exploitation of loss function gra-
dient. Houdini is tailored to generate adversarial examples
for such tasks. Besides successful generation of adversarial
images for classification, Houdini has also been shown
to successfully attack a popular deep Automatic Speech
Recognition system [151]. The authors have also demon-
strated the transferability of attacks in speech recognition
by fooling Google Voice in a black-box attack scenario.
Moreover, successful targeted and non-targeted attacks are
also demonstrated for a deep learning model for human
pose estimation.
3.1.11 Adversarial Transformation Networks (ATNs)
Baluja and Fischer [42] trained feed-forward neural net-
works to generate adversarial examples against other tar-
geted networks or set of networks. The trained models were
termed Adversarial Transformation Networks (ATNs). The
adversarial examples generated by these networks are com-
puted by minimizing a joint loss function comprising of two
parts. The first part restricts the adversarial example to have
perceptual similarity with the original image, whereas the
second part aims at altering the prediction of the targeted
network on the resulting image.
Along the same direction, Hayex and Danezis [47] also
used an attacker neural network to learn adversarial ex-
amples for black-box attacks. In the presented results, the
examples computed by the attacker network remain percep-
tually indistinguishable from the clean images but they are
misclassified by the targeted networks with overwhelming
probabilities - reducing classification accuracy from 99.4%
to 0.77% on MNIST data [10], and from 91.4% to 6.8% on
the CIFAR-10 dataset [152].
3.1.12 Miscellaneous Attacks
The adversarial attacks discussed above are either the pop-
ular ones in the recent literature or they are representative
of the research directions that are fast becoming popular.
A summary of the main attributes of these attacks is also
provided in Table 1. For a comprehensive study, below we
provide brief descriptions of further techniques to generate
adversarial attacks on deep neural networks. We note that
this research area is currently highly active. Whereas every
attempt has been made to review as many approaches as
possible, we do not claim the review to be exhaustive. Due
to high activity in this research direction, many more attacks
are likely to surface in the near future.
Sabour et al. [26] showed the possibility of generating
adversarial examples by altering the internal layers of deep
neural networks. The authors demonstrated that it is possi-
ble to make internal network representation of adversarial
images to resemble representations of images from different
classes. Papernot et al. [109] studied transferability of ad-
versarial attacks for deep learning as well as other machine
learning techniques and introduced further transferability
attacks. Narodytska and Kasiviswanathan [54] also intro-
duced further black-box attacks that have been found ef-
fective in fooling the neural networks by changing only few
pixel values in the images. Liu et al. [31] introduced ‘epsilon-
neighborhood’ attack that have been shown to fool defen-
sively distilled networks [108] with 100% success for white-
box attacks. Oh et al. [133] took a ‘Game Theory’ perspective
on adversarial attacks and derived a strategy to counter
the counter-measures taken against adversarial attacks on
deep neural networks. Mpouri et al. [135] developed a
data-independent approach to generate universal adversar-
ial perturbations for the deep network models. Hosseini
et al. [98] introduced the notion of ‘semantic adversarial
examples’ - input images that represent semantically same
objects for humans but deep neural networks misclassify
them. They used negatives of the images as semantic adver-
sarial examples. Kanbak et al. [73] introduced ‘ManiFool’
algorithm in the wake of DeepFool method [72] to measure
robustness of deep neural networks against geometrically
perturbed images. Dong et al. [170] proposed an iterative
method to boost adversarial attacks for black-box scenarios.
Recently, Carlini and Wagner [59] also demonstrated that
ten different defenses against perturbations can again be
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TABLE 1: Summary of the attributes of diverse attacking methods: The ‘perturbation norm’ indicates the restricted `p-norm
of the perturbations to make them imperceptible. The strength (higher for more asterisks) is based on the impression from
the reviewed literature.
Method Black/White box Targeted/Non-targeted Specific/Universal Perturbation norm Learning Strength
L-BFGS [22] White box Targeted Image specific `∞ One shot ∗ ∗ ∗
FGSM [23] White box Targeted Image specific `∞ One shot ∗ ∗ ∗
BIM & ILCM [35] White box Non targeted Image specific `∞ Iterative ∗∗∗∗
JSMA [60] White box Targeted Image specific `0 Iterative ∗ ∗ ∗
One-pixel [68] Black box Non Targeted Image specific `0 Iterative ∗∗
C&W attacks [36] White box Targeted Image specific `0, `2, `∞ Iterative ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
DeepFool [72] White box Non targeted Image specific `2, `∞ Iterative ∗∗∗∗
Uni. perturbations [16] White box Non targeted Universal `2, `∞ Iterative ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
UPSET [146] Black box Targeted Universal `∞ Iterative ∗∗∗∗
ANGRI [146] Black box Targeted Image specific `∞ Iterative ∗∗∗∗
Houdini [131] Black box Targeted Image specific `2, `∞ Iterative ∗∗∗∗
ATNs [42] White box Targeted Image specific `∞ Iterative ∗∗∗∗
defeated by new attacks constructed using new loss func-
tions. Rozsa et al. [94] also proposed a ‘hot/cold’ method
for generating multiple possible adversarial examples for
a single image. Interestingly, adversarial perturbations are
not only being added to images to reduces the accuracy of
deep learning classifiers. Yoo et al. [195] recently proposed
an approach to also slightly improve the classification per-
formance with the help of subtle perturbation to images.
We note that the authors of many works reviewed in this
article have made the source code of their implementations
publicly available. This is one of the major reasons behind
the current rise in this research direction. Beside those
resources, there are also libraries, e.g. Cleverhans [111], [112]
that have started emerging in order to further boost this
research direction. Adversarial-Playground (https://github.
com/QData/AdversarialDNN-Playground) is another ex-
ample of a toolbox made public by Norton and Qi [142]
to understand adversarial attacks.
3.2 Attacks beyond classification/recognition
With the exception of Houdini [131], all the mainstream ad-
versarial attacks reviewed in Section 3.1 directly focused on
the task of classification - typically fooling CNN-based [10]
classifiers. However, due to the seriousness of adversarial
threats, attacks are also being actively investigated beyond
the classification/recognition task in Computer Vision. Be-
low, we review the works that develop approaches to attack
deep neural networks beyond classification.
3.2.1 Attacks on Autoencoders and Generative Models
Tabacof et al. [128] investigated adversarial attacks for au-
toencoders [154], and proposed a technique to distort input
image (to make it adversarial) that misleads the autoencoder
to reconstruct a completely different image. Their approach
attacks the internal representation of a neural network such
that the representation for the adversarial image becomes
similar to that of the target image. However, it is reported
in [128] that autoencoders seem to be much more robust
to adversarial attacks than the typical classifier networks.
Kos et al. [121] also explored methods for computing adver-
sarial examples for deep generative models, e.g. variational
autoencoder (VAE) and the VAE-Generative Adversarial
Networks (VAE-GANs). GANs, such as [153] are becom-
ing exceedingly popular now-a-days in Computer Vision
applications due to their ability to learn data distributions
and generate realistic images using those distributions. The
authors introduced three different classes of attacks for VAE
and VAE-GANs. Owing to the success of these attacks it is
concluded that the deep generative models are also vulner-
able to adversaries that can convince them to turn inputs
into very different outputs. This work adds further support
to the hypothesis that “adversarial examples are a general
phenomenon for current neural network architectures”.
3.2.2 Attack on Recurrent Neural Networks
Papernot et al. [110] successfully generated adversarial
input sequences for Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs).
RNNs are deep learning models that are particularly suit-
able for learning mappings between sequential inputs and
outputs [155]. Papernot et al. demonstrated that the algo-
rithms proposed to compute adversarial examples for the
feed-forward neural networks (e.g. FGSM [23]) can also
be adapted for fooling RNNs. In particular, the authors
demonstrated successful fooling of the popular Long-Short-
Term-Memory (LSTM) RNN architecture [156]. It is con-
cluded that the cyclic neural network model like RNNs
are also not immune to the adversarial perturbations that
were originally uncovered in the context of acyclic neural
networks, i.e. CNNs.
3.2.3 Attacks on Deep Reinforcement Learning
Lin et al. [134] proposed two different adversarial attacks
for the agents trained by deep reinforcement learning [157].
In the first attack, called ‘strategically-timed attack’, the
adversary minimizes the reward of the agent by attack-
ing it at a small subset of time steps in an episode. A
method is proposed to determine when an adversarial
example should be crafted and applied, which enables
the attack to go undetected. In the second attack, referred
as ‘enchanting attack’, the adversary lures the agent to a
designated target state by integrating a generative model
and a planning algorithm. The generative model is used
for predicting the future states of the agent, whereas the
planning algorithm generates the actions for luring it. The
attacks are successfully tested against the agents trained by
the state-of-the-art deep reinforcement learning algorithms
[157], [158]. Details on this work and example videos of
the adversarial attacks can be found on the following URL:
http://yclin.me/adversarial attack RL/.
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In another work, Huang et al. [62] demonstrated that
FGSM [23] can also be used to significantly degrade perfor-
mance of trained policies in the context of deep reinforce-
ment learning. Their threat model considers adversaries that
are capable of introducing minor perturbations to the raw
input of the policy. The conducted experiments demonstrate
that it is fairly easy to confuse neural network policies
with adversarial examples, even in black-box scenarios.
Videos and further details on this work are available on
http://rll.berkeley.edu/adversarial/.
3.2.4 Attacks on Semantic Segmentation and Object De-
tection
Semantic image segmentation and object detection are
among the mainstream problems in Computer Vision. In-
spired by Moosavi-Dezfooli [16], Metzen et al. [67] showed
the existence of image-agnostic quasi-imperceptible pertur-
bations that can fool a deep neural network into signifi-
cantly corrupting the predicted segmentation of the images.
Moreover, they also showed that it is possible to compute
noise vectors that can remove a specific class from the
segmented classes while keeping most of the image seg-
mentation unchanged (e.g. removing pedestrians from road
scenes). Although it is argued that the “space of the adver-
sarial perturbations for the semantic image segmentation
is presumably smaller than image classification”, the per-
turbations have been shown to generalize well for unseen
validation images with high probability. Arnab et al. [51]
also evaluated FGSM [23] based adversarial attacks for
semantic segmentation and noted that many observations
about these attacks for classification do not directly transfer
to segmentation task.
Xie et al. [115] computed adversarial examples for se-
mantic segmentation and object detection under the ob-
servation that these tasks can be formulated as classifying
multiple targets in an image - the target is a pixel or a
receptive field in segmentation, and object proposal in detec-
tion. Under this perspective, their approach, called ‘Dense
Adversary Generation’ optimizes a loss function over a set
of pixels/proposals to generate adversarial examples. The
generated examples are tested to fool a variety of deep learn-
ing based segmentation and detection approaches. Their
experimental evaluation not only demonstrates successful
fooling of the targeted networks but also shows that the
generated perturbations generalize well across different net-
work models. In Fig. 4, we show a representative example
of network fooling for segmentation and detection using the
approach in [115].
4 ATTACKS IN THE REAL WORLD
4.0.1 Attacks on Face Attributes
Face attributes are among the emerging soft biometrics for
modern security systems. Although face attribute recogni-
tion can also be categorized as a classification problem, we
separately review some interesting attacks in this direction
because face recognition itself is treated as a mainstream
problem in Computer Vision.
Rozsa et al. [130], [160] explored the stability of mul-
tiple deep learning approaches using the CelebA bench-
mark [161] by generating adversarial examples to alter the
Fig. 4: Adversarial example for semantic segmentation and
object detection [115]. FCN [159] and Faster-RCNN [150] are
used for segmentation and detection, respectively. Left col-
umn (top-down): Clean image, normal segmentation (pur-
ple region is predicted as dog) and detection results. Right
column (top-down): Perturbation 10x, fooled segmentation
(light green region is predicted as train and the pink region
as person) and detection results.
Fig. 5: Top-row: Example of changing a facial attribute
‘wearing lipstick’ to ‘not wearing lipstick’ by Fast Flipping
Attribute method [130]. Bottom row: Changing gender with
perturbation generated by [162].
results of facial attribute recognition, see top-row in Fig. 5.
By attacking the deep network classifiers with their so-
called ‘Fast Flipping Attribute’ technique, they found that
robustness of deep neural networks against the adversarial
attacks varies highly between facial attributes. It is claimed
that adversarial attacks are very effective in changing the
label of a target attribute to a correlated attribute. Mir-
jalili and Ross [162] proposed a technique that modifies a
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Fig. 6: Example of adversarial attack on mobile phone cameras: A clean image (a) was taken and used to generate different
adversarial images. The images were printed and the TensorFlow Camera Demo app [181] was used to classify them. A
clean image (b) is recognized correctly as a ‘washer’ when perceived through the camera, whereas adversarial images (c)
and (d) are mis-classified. The images also show network confidence in the range [0,1] for each image. The value of  is
given for (3).
face image such that its gender (for a gender classifier) is
modified, whereas its biometric utility for a face matching
system remains intact, see bottom-row in Fig. 5. Similarly,
Shen et al. [144] proposed two different techniques to gen-
erate adversarial examples for faces that can have high
‘attractiveness scores’ but low ‘subjective scores’ for the face
attractiveness evaluation using deep neural network. We
refer to [185] for further attacks related to the task of face
recognition.
The literature reviewed in Section 3 assumes settings
where adversaries directly feed deep neural networks with
perturbed images. Moreover, the effectiveness of attacks are
also evaluated using standard image databases. Whereas
those settings have proven sufficient to convince many
researchers that adversarial attacks are a real concern for
deep learning in practice, we also come across instances in
the literature (e.g. [48], [30]) where this concern is down-
played and adversarial examples are implicated to be ‘only a
matter of curiosity’ with little practical concerns. Therefore,
this Section is specifically dedicated to the literature that
deals with the adversarial attacks in practical real-world
conditions to help settle the debate.
4.1 Cell-phone camera attack
Kurakin et al. [35] first demonstrated that threats of adver-
sarial attacks also exist in the physical world. To illustrate
this, they printed adversarial images and took snapshots
from a cell-phone camera. These images were fed to Tensor-
Flow Camera Demo app [181] that uses Google’s Inception
model [145] for object classification. It was shown that
a large fraction of images were misclassified even when
perceived through the camera. In Fig. 6, an example is
shown from the original paper. A video is also provided on
the following URL https://youtu.be/zQ uMenoBCk that
shows the threat of adversarial attacks with further images.
This work studies FGSM [23], BIM and ILCM [35] methods
for attacks in the physical world.
4.2 Road sign attack
Etimov et al. [75] built on the attacks proposed in [36]
and [88] to design robust perturbations for the physical
world. They demonstrated the possibility of attacks that
are robust to physical conditions, such as variation in view
angles, distance and resolution. The proposed algorithm,
termed RP2 for Robust Physical Perturbations, was used
to generate adversarial examples for road sign recognition
systems that achieved high fooling ratios in practical drive-
by settings. Two attack classes were introduced in this work
for the physical road signs, (a) poster-printing: where the
attacker prints a perturbed road sign poster and places
it over the real sign (see Fig. 7), (b) sticker perturbation:
where the printing is done on a paper and the paper is
stuck over the real sign. For (b) two types of perturbations
were studied, (b1) subtle perturbations: that occupied the
entire sign and (b2) camouflage perturbations: that took
the form of graffiti sticker on the sign. As such, all these
perturbations require access to a color printer and no other
special hardware. Successful generation of perturbations for
both (a) and (b) such that the perturbations remained robust
to natural variations in the physical world demonstrate the
threat of adversarial example in the real world. We refer to
the following URL for further details and videos related to
this work: https://iotsecurity.eecs.umich.edu/#roadsigns.
It should be noted that Lu et al. [30] had previously
claimed that adversarial examples are not a concern for
object detection in Autonomous Vehicles because of the
changing physical conditions in a moving car. However,
the attacking methods they employed [22], [23], [35] were
somewhat primitive. The findings of Etimov et al. [75] are
orthogonal to the results in [66]. However, in a follow-up
work Lu et al. [19] showed that the detectors like YOLO
9000 [149] and FasterRCNN [150] are ‘currently’ not fooled
by the attacks introduced by Etimov et al. [75]. Zeng et
al. [87] also argue that adversarial perturbations in the
image space do not generalize well in the physical space
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Fig. 7: Example of road sign attack [75]: The success rate of fooling LISA-CNN [75] classifier on all the shown images is
100%. The distance and angle to the camera are also shown. The classifier is trained using LISA dataset for road signs [176].
of the real-world. However, Athalye et al. [65] showed that
we can actually print 3D physical objects for successful
adversarial attacks in the physical world. We discuss [65]
in Section 4.3.
Gu et al. [33] also explored an interesting notion of
threats to outsourced training of the neural networks in
the context of fooling neural networks on street signs. They
showed that it is possible to train a network (a BadNet) that
shows state-of-the-art performance on the user’s training
and validation samples, but behaves badly on attacker-
chosen inputs. They demonstrated this attack in a realistic
scenario by creating a street sign classifier that identifies
stop signs as speed limits when a special sticker is added
to the stop sign. Moreover, it was found that the fooling of
the network persisted to a reasonable extent even when the
network was later fine-tuned with additional training data.
4.3 Generic adversarial 3D objects
Athalye et al. [65] introduced a method for constructing 3D
objects that can fool neural networks across a wide variety
of angles and viewpoints. Their ‘Expectation Over Transfor-
mation’ (EOT) framework is able to construct examples that
are adversarial over an entire distribution of image/object
transformations. Their end-to-end approach is able to print
arbitrary adversarial 3D objects. In our opinion, results of
this work ascertain that adversarial attacks are a real concern
for deep learning in the physical world. In Fig. 8 we show
an example of 3D-printed turtle that is modified by EOT
framework to be classified as rifle. A video demonstrating
the fooling by EOT in the physical world is available at
the following URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
YXy6oX1iNoA&feature=youtu.be.
4.4 Cyberspace attacks
Papernot et al. [39] launched one of the first attacks against
the deep neural network classifiers in cyberspace in the real-
world settings. They trained a substitute network for the
targeted black-box classifier on synthetic data, and instan-
tiated the attack against remotely hosted neural networks
by MetaMind, Amazon and Google. They were able to
show that the respective targeted networks misclassified
84.24%, 96.19% and 88.94% of the adversarial examples
generated by their method. Indeed, the only information
available to the attacker in their threat model was the output
label of the targeted network for the input image fed by
the attacker. In a related work, Liu et al. [88] developed
an ensemble based attack and showed its success against
Clarifai.com - a commercial company providing state-of-the-
art image classification services. The authors claim that their
attacks for both targeted and non-targeted fooling are able
to achieve high success rates.
Grosse et al. [61] showed construction of effective ad-
versarial attacks for neural networks used as malware clas-
sifiers. As compared to image recognition, the domain of
malware classification introduces additional constraints in
the adversarial settings, e.g. continuous input domains are
replaced by discrete inputs, the condition of visual similarity
is replaced by requiring equivalent functional behavior.
However, Grosse et al. [61] showed that creating effective
adversarial examples is still possible for maleware classi-
fication. Further examples of successful adversarial attacks
against deep lrearning based malware classification can also
be found in [64], [107], [125].
4.5 Robotic Vision & Visual QA Attacks
Melis et al. [63] demonstrated the vulnerability of robots
to the adversarial manipulations of the input images using
the techniques in [22]. The authors argue that strategies to
enforce deep neural networks to learn more stable repre-
sentations are necessary for secure robotics. Xu et al. [40]
generated adversarial attacks for the Visual Turing Test, also
known as ‘Visual Question Answer’ (VQA). The authors
show that the commonly used compositional and non-
compositional VQA architectures that employ deep neural
networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Moreover,
the adversarial examples are transferable between the mod-
els. They conclude that the “adversarial examples pose real
threats to not only image classification models, but also
more complicated VQA models” [63].
5 EXISTENCE OF ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
In the literature related to adversarial attacks on deep
learning in Computer Vision, there are varied views on the
existence of adversarial examples. These views generally
align well with the local empirical observations made by the
researchers while attacking or defending the deep neural
networks. However, they often fall short in terms of gen-
eralization. For instance, the popular linearity hypothesis of
Goodfellow et al. [23] explains the FGSM and related attacks
very well. However, Tanay and Griffin [74] demonstrated
image classes that do not suffer from adversarial examples
for linear classifier, which is not in-line with the linearity
hypothesis. Not to mention, the linearity hypothesis itself
deviates strongly from the previously prevailing opinion
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Fig. 8: Different random poses of a 3D-printed turtle perturbed by EOT [65] to be classified as a rifle by an ImageNet
classifier. The unperturbed version (not shown) is classified correctly with 100% probability.
that the adversarial examples stem from highly non-linear
decision boundaries induced by deep neural networks.
There are also other examples in the literature where the
linearity hypothesis is not directly supported [119].
Flatness of decision boundaries [69], large local curva-
ture of the decision boundaries [70] and low flexibility of the
networks [71] are some more examples of the viewpoints on
the existence of adversarial examples that do not perfectly
align with each other. Whereas it is apparent that adversarial
examples can be formed by modifying as little as one pixel
in an image, current literature seems to lack consensus on
the reasons for the existence of the adversarial examples.
This fact also makes analysis of adversarial examples an
active research direction that is expected to explore and
explain the nature of the decision boundaries induced by
deep neural networks, which are currently more commonly
treated as black-box models. Below, we review the works
that mainly focus on analyzing the existence of adversarial
perturbations for deep learning. We note that, besides the lit-
erature reviewed below, works related to adversarial attacks
(Section 3) and defenses (Section 6) often provide brief anal-
ysis of adversarial perturbations while conjecturing about
the phenomena resulting in the existence of the adversarial
examples.
5.1 Limits on adversarial robustness
Fawzi et al. [118] introduced a framework for studying
the instability of classifiers to adversarial perturbations.
They established fundamental limits on the robustness of
classifiers in terms of a ‘distinguishability measure’ between
the classes of the dataset, where distinguishability is defined
as the distance between the means of two classes for linear
classifiers and the distance between the matrices of second
order moments for the studied non-linear classifiers. This
work shows that adversarial examples also exist for the clas-
sifiers beyond deep neural networks. The presented analysis
traces back the phenomenon of adversarial instability to the
low flexibility of the classifiers, which is not completely
orthogonal to the prevailing belief at that time that high-
nonlinearity of the networks make them susceptible to
adversarial examples.
5.2 Space of adversarial examples
Tabacof and Eduardo [25] generated adversarial examples
for shallow and deep network classifiers on MNIST [10]
and ImageNet [11] datasets and probed the pixel space of
adversarial examples by using noise of varying distribu-
tion and intensity. The authors empirically demonstrated
that adversarial examples appear in large regions in the
pixel space, which is in-line with the similar claim in [23].
However, somewhat in contrast to the linearity hypothesis,
they argue that a weak, shallow and more linear classifier is
also as susceptible to adversarial examples as a strong deep
classifier.
Tramer et al. [132] proposed a method to estimate the
dimensionality of the space of the adversarial examples. It
is claimed that the adversarial examples span a contiguous
high dimension space (e.g. with dimensionality ≈ 25). Due
to high dimensionality, the subspaces of different classifiers
can intersect, which gives rise to the transferability of the
adversarial examples. Interestingly, their analysis suggests
that it is possible to defend classifiers against transfer-based
attacks even when they are vulnerable to direct attacks.
5.3 Boundary tilting perspective
Tanay and Griffin [74] provided a ‘boundary tilting’ per-
spective on the existence of adversarial examples for deep
neural networks. They argued that generally a single class
data that is sampled to learn and evaluate a classifier lives
in a sub-manifold of the class, and adversarial examples
for that class exist when the classification boundary lies
close to this sub-manifold. They formalized the notion of
‘adversarial strength’ of a classifier and reduced it to the
‘deviation angle’ between the boundaries of the considered
classifier and the nearest centroid classifier. It is then shown
that adversarial strength of a classifier can be varied by
decision ‘boundary tilting’. The authors also argued that
adversarial stability of the classifier is associated with its
regularization. In the opinion of Tanay and Griffin, the
linearity hypothesis [23] about the existence of adversarial
examples is “unconvincing”.
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5.4 Prediction uncertainty and evolutionary stalling of
training cause adversaries
Cubuk et al. [91] argue that the “origin of adversarial exam-
ples is primarily due to an inherent uncertainty that neural
networks have about their predictions”. They empirically
compute a functional form of the uncertainty, which is
shown to be independent of network architecture, training
protocol and dataset. It is argued that this form only de-
pends on the statistics of the network logit differences. This
eventually results in fooling ratios caused by adversarial
attacks to exhibit a universal scaling with respect to the
size of perturbation. They studied FGSM [23], ILCM and
BIM [35] based attacks to corroborate their claims. It is
also claimed that accuracy of a network on clean images
correlates with its adversarial robustness (see Section 5.5 for
more arguments in this direction).
Rozsa et al. [102] hypothesized that the existence of
adversarial perturbations is a result of evolutionary stalling
of decision boundaries on training images. In their opinion,
individual training samples stop contributing to the train-
ing loss of the model (i.e. neural network) once they are
classified correctly, which can eventually leave them close
to the decision boundary. Hence, it becomes possible to
throw those (and similar) samples away to a wrong class
region by adding minor perturbations. They proposed a
Batch Adjusted Network Gradients (BANG) algorithm to
train a network to mitigate the evolutionary stalling during
training.
5.5 Accuracy-adversarial robustness correlation
In the quest of explaining the existence of adversarial per-
turbations, Rozsa et al. [97] empirically analyzed the correla-
tion between the accuracy of eight deep network classifiers
and their robustness to three adversarial attacks introduced
in [23], [94]. The studied classifiers include AlexNet [9],
VGG-16 and VGG-19 networks [163], Berkeley-trained ver-
sion of GoogLeNet and Princeton-GoogLeNet [18], ResNet-
52; ResNet-101; and ResNet-152 [147]. The adversarial ex-
amples are generated with the help of large-scale ImageNet
dataset [11] using the techniques proposed in [23] and [94].
Their experiments lead to the observation that the networks
with higher classification accuracy generally also exhibit
more robustness against the adversarial examples. They also
concluded that adversarial examples transfer better between
similar network topologies.
5.6 More on linearity as the source
Kortov and Hopfiled [127] examined the existence of ad-
versarial perturbations in the context of Dense Associative
Memory (DAM) models [164]. As compared to the typical
modern deep neural networks, DAM models employ higher
order (more than quadratic) interactions between the neu-
rons. The authors have demonstrated that adversarial exam-
ples generated using DAM models with smaller interaction
power, which is similar to using a deep neural network with
ReLU activation [165] for inducing linearity, are unable to
fool models having higher order interactions. The authors
provided empirical evidence on the existence of adversarial
examples that is independent of the FGSM [23] attack, yet
supports the linearity hypothesis of Goodfellow et al. [23].
5.7 Existence of universal perturbations
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [16] initially argued that universal
adversarial perturbations exploit geometric correlations be-
tween the decision boundaries induced by the classifiers.
Their existence partly owes to a subspace containing nor-
mals to the decision boundaries, such that the normals also
surround the natural images. In [70], they built further on
their theory and showed the existence of common directions
(shared across datapoints) along which the decision bound-
ary of a classifier can be highly positively curved. They
argue that such directions play a key role in the existence of
universal perturbations. Based on their findings, the authors
also propose a new geometric method to efficiently compute
universal adversarial perturbations.
It is worth noting that previously Fawzi et al. [69] also
associated the theoretical bounds on the robustness of
classifiers to the curvature of decision boundaries. Similarly,
Tramer et al. [77] also held the curvature of decision
boundaries in the vicinity of data points responsible for
the vulnerability of neural networks to black-box attacks.
In another recent work, Mopuri et al. [193] present a
GAN-like model to learn the distribution of the universal
adversarial perturbations for a given target model. The
learned distributions are also observed to show good
transferability across models.
6 DEFENSES AGAINST ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
Currently, the defenses against the adversarial attacks are
being developed along three main directions:
1) Using modified training during learning or modified
input during testing.
2) Modifying networks, e.g. by adding more layers/sub-
networks, changing loss/activation functions etc.
3) Using external models as network add-on when clas-
sifying unseen examples.
The approaches along the first direction do not directly
deal with the learning models. On the other hand, the other
two categories are more concerned with the neural networks
themselves. The techniques under these categories can be
further divided into two types; namely (a) complete defense
and (b) detection only. The ‘complete defense’ approaches
aim at enabling the targeted network to achieve its original
goal on the adversarial examples, e.g. a classifier predicting
labels of adversarial examples with acceptable accuracy. On
the other hand, ‘detection only’ approaches are meant to
raise the red flag on potentially adversarial examples to
reject them in any further processing. The taxonomy of the
described categories is also shown in Fig. 9. The remaining
section is organized according to this taxonomy. In the used
taxonomy, the difference between ‘modifying’ a network
and employing an ‘add-on’ is that the former makes changes
to the original deep neural network architecture/parameters
during training. On the other hand, the latter keeps the
original model intact and appends external model(s) to it
during testing.
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Fig. 9: Broad categorization of approaches aimed at defend-
ing deep neural networks against adversarial attacks.
6.1 Modified training/input
6.1.1 Brute-force adversarial training
Since the discovery of adversarial examples for the deep
neural networks [22], there has been a general consen-
sus in the related literature that robustness of neural net-
works against these examples improves with adversarial
training. Therefore, most of the contributions introducing
new adversarial attacks, e.g. [22], [23], [72] (see Section 3)
simultaneously propose adversarial training as the first
line of defense against those attacks. Although adversarial
training improves robustness of a network, to be really
effective, it requires that training is performed using strong
attacks and the architecture of the network is sufficiently
expressive. Since adversarial training necessitates increased
training/data size, we refer to it as a ‘brute-force’ strategy.
It is also commonly observed in the literature that
brute-force adversarial training results in regularizing the
network (e.g. see [23], [90]) to reduce over-fitting, which
in turn improves robustness of the networks against the
adversarial attacks. Inspired by this observation, Miyato et
al. [113] proposed a ‘Virtual Adversarial Training’ approach
to smooth the output distributions of the neural networks. A
related ‘stability training’ method is also proposed by Zheng
et al. [116] to improve the robustness of neural networks
against small distortions to input images. It is noteworthy
that whereas adversarial training is known to improve ro-
bustness of neural networks, Moosavi-Dezfooli [16] showed
that effective adversarial examples can again be computed
for already adversarially trained networks.
6.1.2 Data compression as defense
Dziugaite et al. [123] noted that most of the popular im-
age classification datasets comprise JPG images. Motivated
by this observation, they studied the effects of JPG com-
pression on the perturbations computed by FGSM [23].
It is reported that JPG compression can actually reverse
the drop in classification accuracy to a large extent for
the FGSM perturbations. Nevertheless, it is concluded that
compression alone is far from an effective defense. JPEG
compression was also studied by Guo et al. [82] for mitigat-
ing the effectiveness of adversarial images. Das et al. [37]
also took a similar approach and used JPEG compression
to remove the high frequency components from images
and proposed an ensemble-based technique to counter the
adversarial attacks generated by FGSM [23] and DeepFool
method [72]. Whereas encouraging results are reported
in [37], there is no analysis provided for the stronger attacks,
e.g. C&W attacks [36]. Moreover, Shin and Song [186] have
demonstrated the existence of adversarial examples that
can survive JPEG compression. Compression under Discrete
Cosine Transform (DCT) was also found inadequate as
a defense against the universal perturbations [16] in our
previous work [81]. One major limitation of compression
based defense is that larger compressions also result in
loss of classification accuracy on clean images, whereas
smaller compressions often do not adequately remove the
adversarial perturbations.
In another related approach, Bhagoji et al. [169] proposed
to compress input data using Principal Component Analysis
for adversarial robustness. However, Xu et al. [140] noted
that this compression also results in corrupting the spatial
structure of the image, hence often adversely affecting the
classification performance.
6.1.3 Foveation based defense
Luo et al. [119] demonstrated that significant robustness
against the adversarial attacks using L-BFGS [22] and
FGSM [23] is possible with ‘foveation’ mechanism - ap-
plying neural network in different regions of images. It is
hypothesized that CNN-based classifiers trained on large
datasets, such as ImageNet [11] are generally robust to scale
and translation variations of objects in the images. However,
this invariance does not extend to adversarial patterns in the
images. This makes foveation as a viable option for reducing
the effectiveness of adversarial attacks proposed in [22], [23].
However, foveation is yet to demonstrate its effectiveness
against more powerful attacks.
6.1.4 Data randomization and other methods
Xie et al. [115] showed that random resizing of the adversar-
ial examples reduces their effectiveness. Moreover, adding
random padding to such examples also results in reducing
the fooling rates of the networks. Wang et al. [138] trans-
formed the input data with a separate data-transformation
module to remove possible adversarial perturbations in
images. In the literature, we also find evidence that data
augmentation during training (e.g. Gaussian data augmen-
tation [46]) also helps in improving robustness of neural
networks to adversarial attacks, albeit only slightly.
6.2 Modifying the network
For the approaches that modify the neural networks for
defense against the adversarial attacks, we first discuss
the ‘complete defense’ approaches. The ‘detection only’
approaches are separately reviewed in Section 6.2.8.
6.2.1 Deep Contractive Networks
In the early attempts of making deep learning robust to
adversarial attacks, Gu and Rigazio [24] introduced Deep
Contractive Networks (DCN). It was shown that Denoising
Auto Encoders [154] can reduce adversarial noise, however
stacking them with the original networks can make the
resulting network even more vulnerable to perturbations.
Based on this observation, the training procedure of DCNs
used a smoothness penalty similar to Contractive Auto
Encoders [173]. Whereas reasonable robustness of DCNs
was demonstrated against the L-BGFS [22] based attacks,
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many stronger attacks have been introduced since DCNs
were initially proposed. A related concept of using auto
encoders for adversarial robustness of the neural networks
can be also found in [141].
6.2.2 Gradient regularization/masking
Ross and Doshi-Velez [52] studied input gradient regular-
ization [167] as a method for adversarial robustness. Their
method trains differentiable models (e.g. deep neural net-
works) while penalizing the degree of variation resulting in
the output with respect to change in the input. Implying, a
small adversarial perturbation becomes unlikely to change
the output of the trained model drastically. It is shown that
this method, when combined with brute-force adversarial
training, can result in very good robustness against attacks
like FGSM [23] and JSMA [60]. However, each of these meth-
ods almost double the training complexity of a network,
which is already prohibitive in many cases.
Previously, Lyu et al. [28] also used the notion of pe-
nalizing the gradient of loss function of network models
with respect to the inputs to incorporate robustness in the
networks against L-BFGS [22] and FGSM [23] based attacks.
Similarly, Shaham et al. [27] attempted to improve the
local stability of neural networks by minimizing the loss
of a model over adversarial examples at each parameter
update. They minimized the loss of their model over worst-
case adversarial examples instead of the original data. In a
related work, Nguyen and Sinha [44] introduced a masking
based defense against C&W attack [36] by adding noise to
the logit outputs of networks.
6.2.3 Defensive distillation
Papernot et al. [38] exploited the notion of ‘distillation’ [166]
to make deep neural networks robust against adversarial
attacks. Distillation was introduced by Hinton et al. [166]
as a training procedure to transfer knowledge of a more
complex network to a smaller network. The variant of the
procedure introduced by Papernot et al. [38] essentially
uses the knowledge of the network to improve its own
robustness. The knowledge is extracted in the form of class
probability vectors of the training data and it is fed back
to train the original model. It is shown that doing so
improves resilience of a network to small perturbation in
the images. Further empirical evidence in this regard is also
provided in [108]. Moreover, in a follow-up work, Papernot
et al. [84] also extended the defensive distillation method by
addressing the numerical instabilities that were encountered
in [38]. It is worth noting that the ‘Carlini and Wagner’
(C&W) attacks [36] introduced in Section 3.1 are claimed
to be successful against the defensive distillation technique.
We also note that defensive distillation can also be seen as
an example of ‘gradient masking’ technique. However, we
describe it separately keeping in view its popularity in the
literature.
6.2.4 Biologically inspired protection
Nayebi and Ganguli [124] demonstrated natural robust-
ness of neural networks against adversarial attacks with
highly non-linear activations (similar to nonlinear dendritic
computations). It is noteworthy that the Dense Associative
Memory models of Krotov and Hopfield [127] also work
on a similar principle for robustness against the adversarial
examples. Considering the linearity hypothesis of Goodfel-
low et al. [23], [124] and [127] seem to further the notion
of susceptibility of modern neural networks to adversarial
examples being the effect of linearity of activations. We note
that Brendel and Bethge [187] claim that the attacks fail on
the biologically inspired protection [124] due to numerical
limitations of computations. Stabilizing the computations
again allow successful attacks on the protected networks.
6.2.5 Parseval Networks
Cisse et al. [131] proposed ‘Parseval’ networks as a defense
against the adversarial attacks. These networks employ a
layer-wise regularization by controlling the global Lipschitz
constant of the network. Considering that a network can be
seen as a composition of functions (at each layer), robustifi-
cation against small input perturbations is possible by main-
taining a small Lipschitz constant for these functions. Cisse
et al. proposed to do so by controlling the spectral norm of
the weight matrices of the networks by parameterizing them
with ‘parseval tight frames’ [172], hence the name ‘Parseval’
networks.
6.2.6 DeepCloak
Gao et al. [139] proposed to insert a masking layer immedi-
ately before the layer handling the classification. The added
layer is explicitly trained by forward-passing clean and
adversarial pair of images, and it encodes the differences
between the output features of the previous layers for those
image pairs. It is argued that the most dominant weights in
the added layer correspond to the most sensitive features of
the network (in terms of adversarial manipulation). There-
fore, while classifying, those features are masked by forcing
the dominant weights of the added layer to zero.
6.2.7 Miscellaneous approaches
Among other notable efforts in making neural networks
robust to adversarial attacks, Zantedeschi et al. [46] pro-
posed to use bounded ReLU [174] to reduce the effective-
ness of adversarial patterns in the images. Jin et al. [120]
introduced a feedforward CNN that used additive noise to
mitigate the effects of adversarial examples. Sun et al. [56]
prposed ‘HyperNetworks’ that use statistical filtering as
a method to make the network robust. Madry et al. [55]
studied adversarial defense from the perspective of robust
optimization. They showed that adversarial training with
a PGD adversary can successfully defend against a range
of other adversaries. Later, Carlini et al. [59] also verified
this observation. Na et al. [85] employed a network that
is regularized with a unified embedding for classification
and low-level similarity learning. The network is penalized
using the distance between clean and the corresponding
adversarial embeddings. Strauss et al. [89] studied ensemble
of methods to defend a network against the perturbations.
Kadran et al. [136] modified the output layer of a neural net-
work to induce robustness against the adversarial attacks.
Wang et al. [129], [122] developed adversary resistant neural
networks by leveraging non-invertible data transformation
in the network. Lee et al. [106] developed manifold regular-
ized networks that use a training objective to minimizes the
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difference between multi-layer embedding results of clean
and adversarial images. Kotler and Wong [96] proposed to
learn ReLU-based classifier that show robustness against
small adversarial perturbations. They train a neural network
that provably achieves high accuracy (¿90%) against any
adversary in a canonical setting ( = 0.1 for `∞-norm
perturbation on MNIST). Raghunathan et al. [189] studied
the problem of defense for neural networks with one hidden
layer. Their approach produces a network and a certificate
on MNIST dataset such that no attack perturbing image
pixels by at most  = 0.1 could results in more than
35% test error. Kolter and Wong [96] and Raghunathan et
al. [189] are among very few provable methods in defense
against the adversarial attacks. Given that these methods
are computationally infeasible to apply on larger networks,
the only defenses that have been extensively evaluated are
those of Madry et al. [55] giving 89% accuracy against large
epsilon (0.3/1) on MNIST and 45% for moderate epsilon
(8/255) on CIFAR. Another thread of works that can be seen
as adversarial attacks/defenses with guarantees is related
to verification of deep neural networks, e.g. [191], [192]. In
their approach OrOrbia et al. [194] show that many differ-
ent proposals of adversarial training are instances of more
general regularized objective, they termed DataGrad. The
proposed DataGrad framework can be seen as an extension
of layerwise contractive autoencoder penalty.
6.2.8 Detection Only approaches
SafetyNet: Lu et al. [66] hypothesized that adversarial
examples produce different patterns of ReLU activations
in (the late stages of) networks than what is produced
by clean images. Based on this hypothesis, they proposed
to append a Radial Basis Function SVM classifier to the
targeted models such that the SVM uses discrete codes
computed by the late stage ReLUs of the network. To
detect perturbation in a test image, its code is compared
against those of training samples using the SVM. Effective
detection of adversarial examples generated by [23], [35],
[72] is demonstrated by their framework, named SafetyNet.
Detector subnetwork: Metzen et al. [78] proposed to
augment a targeted network with a subnetwork that
is trained for a binary classification task of detecting
adversarial perturbations in inputs. It is shown that
appending such a network to the internal layers of a
model and using adversarial training can help in detecting
perturbations generated using FGSM [23], BIM [35] and
DeepFool [72] methods. However, Lu et al. [66] later
showed that this approach is again vulnerable to counter-
counter measures.
Exploiting convolution filter statistics: Li and Li [105]
used statistics of the convolution filters in CNN-based
neural networks to classify the input images as clean or
adversarial. A cascaded classifier is designed that uses
these statistics, and it is shown to detect more than 85%
adversarial images generated by the methods in [22], [114].
Additional class augmentation: Grosse et al. [57] proposed
to augment the potentially targeted neural network model
with an additional class in which the model is trained to
Fig. 10: Illustration of defense against universal perturba-
tions [81]: The approach rectifies an image to restore the
network prediction. The pattern removed by rectification is
separately analyzed to detect perturbation.
classify all the adversarial examples. Hosseini et al. [32] also
employed a similar strategy to detect black-box attacks.
6.3 Network add-ons
6.3.1 Defense against universal perturbations
Akhtar et al. [81] proposed a defense framework against
the adversarial attacks generated using universal perturba-
tions [16]. The framework appends extra ‘pre-input’ layers
to the targeted network and trains them to rectify a per-
turbed image so that the classifier’s prediction becomes
the same as its prediction on the clean version of the
same image. The pre-input layers are termed Perturbation
Rectifying Network (PRN), and they are trained without
updating the parameters of the targeted network. A separate
detector is trained by extracting features from the input-
output differences of PRN for the training images. A test
image is first passed through the PRN and then its features
are used to detect perturbations. If adversarial perturbations
are detected, the output of PRN is used to classify the
test image. Fig. 10, illustrates the rectification performed
by PRN. The removed patterns are separately analyzed for
detection.
6.3.2 GAN-based defense
Lee et al. [101] used the popular framework of Generative
Adversarial Networks [153] to train a network that is robust
to FGSM [23] like attacks. The authors proposed to directly
train the network along a generator network that attempts to
generate perturbation for that network. During its training,
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the classifier keeps trying to correctly classify both the
clean and perturbed images. We categorize this technique
as an ‘add-on’ approach because the authors propose to
always train any network in this fashion. In another GAN-
based defense, Shen et al. [58] use the generator part of the
network to rectify a perturbed image.
6.3.3 Detection Only approaches
Feature squeezing: Xu et al. [43] proposed to use feature
squeezing to detect adversarial perturbation to an image.
They added two external models to the classifier network,
such that these models reduce the color bit depth of each
pixel in the image, and perform spatial smoothing over the
image. The predictions of the targeted network over the
original image and the squeezed images are compared. If a
large difference is found between the predictions, the image
is considered to be an adversarial example. Whereas [43]
demonstrated the effectiveness of this approach against
more classical attacks [23], a follow-up work [140] also
claims that the method works reasonably well against
the more powerful C&W attacks [36]. He et al. [76] also
combined feature squeezing with the ensemble method
proposed in [175] to show that strength of defenses does
not always increase by combining them.
MagNet: Meng and Chen [45] proposed a framework
that uses one or more external detectors to classify an
input image as adversarial or clean. During training, the
framework aims at learning the manifold of clean images.
In the testing phase, the images that are found far from
the manifold are treated as adversarial and are rejected.
The images that are close to the manifold (but not exactly
on it) are always reformed to lie on the manifold and the
classifier is fed with the reformed images. The notion of
attracting nearby images to the manifold of clean images
and dropping the far-off images also inspires the name of
the framework, i.e. MagNet. It is noteworthy that Carlini
and Wagner [188] very recently demonstrated that this
defense technique can also be defeated with slightly larger
perturbations.
Miscellaneous methods: Liang et al. [50] treated perturba-
tions to images as noise and used scalar quantization and
spatial smoothing filter to separately detect such perturba-
tions. In a related approach, Feinman et al. [86] proposed to
detect adversarial perturbations by harnessing uncertainty
estimates (of dropout neural networks) and performing
density estimation in the feature space of neural networks.
Eventually, separate binary classifiers are trained as ad-
versarial example detectors using the proposed features.
Gebhart and Schrater [92] viewed neural network computa-
tion as information flow in graphs and proposed a method
to detect adversarial perturbations by applying persistent
homology to the induced graphs.
7 OUTLOOK OF THE RESEARCH DIRECTION
In the previous sections, we presented a comprehensive
review of the recent literature in adversarial attacks on deep
learning. Whereas several interesting facts were reported in
those sections along the technical details, below we make
more general observations regarding this emerging research
direction. The discussion presents a broader outlook to the
readers without in-depth technical knowledge of this area.
Our arguments are based on the literature reviewed above.
The threat is real: Whereas few works suggest that
adversarial attacks on deep learning may not be a serious
concern, a large body of the related literature indicates
otherwise. The literature reviewed in Sections 3 and 4
clearly demonstrate that adversarial attacks can severely
degrade the performance of deep learning techniques on
multiple Computer Vision tasks, and beyond. In particular,
the literature reviewed in Section 4 ascertains that deep
learning is vulnerable to adversarial attacks in the real
physical world. Therefore, we can conclusively argue that
adversarial attacks pose a real threat to deep learning in
practice.
Adversarial vulnerability is a general phenomenon: The
reviewed literature shows successful fooling of different
types of deep neural networks, e.g. MLPs, CNNs, RNNs
on a variety of tasks in Computer Vision, e.g. recognition,
segmentation, detection. Although most of the existing
works focus on fooling deep learning on the task of
classification/recognition, based on the surveyed literature
we can easily observe that deep learning approaches are
vulnerable to adversarial attacks in general.
Adversarial examples often generalize well: One of the
most common properties of adversarial examples reported
in the literature is that they transfer well between different
neural networks. This is especially true for the networks
that have relatively similar architecture. The generalization
of adversarial examples is often exploited in black-box
attacks.
Reasons of adversarial vulnerability need more
investigation: There are varied view-points in the literature
on the reasons behind the vulnerability of deep neural
networks to subtle adversarial perturbations. Often, these
view-points are not well-aligned with each other. There
is an obvious need for systematic investigation in this
direction.
Linearity does promote vulnerability: Goodfellow et
al. [23] first suggested that the design of modern deep
neural networks that forces them to behave linearly in
high dimensional spaces also makes them vulnerable to
adversarial attacks. Although popular, this notion has also
faced some opposition in the literature. Our survey pointed
out multiple independent contributions that hold linearity
of the neural networks accountable for their vulnerability
to adversarial attacks. Based on this fact, we can argue
that linearity does promote vulnerability of deep neural
networks to the adversarial attacks. However, it does not
seem to be the only reason behind successful fooling of
deep neural networks with cheap analytical perturbations.
Counter-counter measures are possible: Whereas multiple
defense techniques exist to counter adversarial attacks, it
is often shown in the literature that a defended model can
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again be successfully attacked by devising counter-counter
measures, e.g. see [49]. This observation necessitates that
new defenses also provide an estimate of their robustness
against obvious counter-counter measures.
Highly active research direction: The profound impli-
cations of vulnerability of deep neural networks to ad-
versarial perturbations have made research in adversarial
attacks and their defenses highly active in recent time.
The majority of the literature reviewed in this survey
surfaced in the last two years, and there is currently a
continuous influx of contributions in this direction. On
one hand, techniques are being proposed to defend neural
networks against the known attacks, on the other; more
and mote powerful attacks are being devised. Recently, a
Kaggle competition was also organized for the defenses
against the adversarial attacks (https://www.kaggle.com/
c/nips-2017-defense-against-adversarial-attack/). It can be
hoped that this high research activity will eventually result
in making deep learning approaches robust enough to be
used in safety and security critical applications in the real
world.
8 CONCLUSION
This article presented the first comprehensive survey in
the direction of adversarial attacks on deep learning in
Computer Vision. Despite the high accuracies of deep neural
networks on a wide variety of Computer Vision tasks,
they have been found vulnerable to subtle input perturba-
tions that lead them to completely change their outputs.
With deep learning at the heart of the current advances
in machine learning and artificial intelligence, this finding
has resulted in numerous recent contributions that devise
adversarial attacks and their defenses for deep learning.
This article reviews these contributions, mainly focusing on
the most influential and interesting works in the literature.
From the reviewed literature, it is apparent that adversarial
attacks are a real threat to deep learning in practice, espe-
cially in safety and security critical applications. The existing
literature demonstrates that currently deep learning can not
only be effectively attacked in cyberspace but also in the
physical world. However, owing to the very high activity in
this research direction it can be hoped that deep learning
will be able to show considerable robustness against the
adversarial attacks in the future.
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